[WarInEur] suggestions?

[Henry Leroy]

I would argue that a 10% attrition on deployed AP would go a ways to forcing
realignment
if a brit had 120 ap in the box...he just lost 12
that is 10% per month. For ALL sides.
Double the attrition in winter and mud.

But you would have to remove those absurd 'shipping' restrictions. AP and SB
and SE simply become available
just like on the rein track.

If you believe that the AP are the source of the problem

It is my opinion however...that attrition would simply see players build
units that dont attrit

On Sat, Jan 30, 2010 at 4:07 AM, sgminfo <sgminfo at aol.com> wrote:

>  kentsue at cox.net wrote:...many good points...
>
> However...
>
> There are other consequential problems with the CW/Allied air position...
>
> If you adopt the standard build regime...
>
> During 1939-42 the Allied player is unable to match the r*ealigned *priorities
> that the German leadership adopt in the game.
>
> Basically the Game leadership accept that the Luftwaffe was historically
> undervalued in importance....and ALWAYS operate in a manner that makes
> military and political sense.
>
> The CW player looks at his alternatives, with care and precision....
>
> He knows he cannot match the over indulgent way that his opponent operates
> the Luftwaffe....
>
> Since the air war is a production numbers game, and that productuion
> numbers game is already lost....he does not indulge in it...
>
> So the CW player will ALWAYS CHOOSE to build only the minimum commitment of
> airpower, since he will NEVER in this period be in a position to challenge
> without compromising his ground forces....
>
>
> So he solves the issue by NOT FLYING....and increasing his 'airfleet in
> being' by a minimal 2 air points per cycle....
>
> This is a better value investment in productive resources.
>
>
>
> I believe that the production track issue is only 1/2 the issue...if that.
> Of more importance is the corrosive effect of hindsight on the behaviour of
> both sides ministries of production.
>
> I would go so far as to say the critical element of WW2 was the repeated
> failure of the german leadership to face up to responsibilities owed to its
> air commanders and the infrastructure of the Luftwaffe....
>
> That failure is both counter-intuitive, and at the same time somewhat
> inexplicable....
>
>
> The result is that either this political problem is modelled, applying that
> check to the logical ambitions of the air arm, or we recognise that we face
> an immediate and damaging divergence from reality....
>
>
> There are few players who would stand up here and say that the allied
> player does not have a permanent and recurrent issue with the degree of
> Luftwaffe air superiority in the period 1939-42.
>
>
> The recurrent conundrum is:-
>
>  Do we model the restricting factors on the Luftwaffe?
> and stand accused of being  'Axis bashers'
> Or do we accept hindsight wrecks the simulation and live with the resulting
> departures?
>
> THE principal problem with production is the misthreading of the airwar...
>
> It is a feature of the airwar that both sides only fly when BOTH SIDES
> think there is something to be gained....
>
> Because the airwar is a pure numbers game...the weaker side , combat
> wise...is weaker numerically.
> The weaker side ALWAYS tends towards greater losses than the opponent
> The weaker side thus inevitably manoeuvres himself into the position that,
> for continued survival, his airforce must suspend operations and go into
> hiding...
>
> The weaker sides' ONLY prospect of success, is a strategy of minimising
> losses (not flying) whilst actively out building his opponents air
> force...(in 1939-42...an unachievable end).
>
>
>
> The result of this is that WHICHEVER SIDE gets the upperhand in the air,
> overall air losses start to decline...and with that the wastage of
> production that is such a feature of the airwar always tends to break down.
>
> Airboxes tend to get built out early...then the avalanche of productive
> capacity is switched to ground and naval forces, further bending the game.
>
>
> To correct for this effect one needs to increase the productive costs of
> the airwar, to act as a sink for general production that is resulting in
> beingoversubscribed due to ahistorically declining wastage on continuing
> operations in the air, or find a way to recreate that ongoing wastage that
> naturally occurs when intensive air operations are undertaken ITRW...
>
> Whilst the base 10 auircombat system makes air power slightly more
> resilient....it may be that the actual costs in the airwar need to be re
> examined....
>
> It would be worthwhile investigating if a 50% increase in newbuild costs
> would address the issue...
>
> Putting a serious drag on the eforts of expansion pursued by our more
> airminded gamers...
>
>
> As to matching the production tracks with APs....
>
> We are actually chasing shadows.....
>
> IT IS NOT THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF THE stylised airforces that are important,
> but THE RELATIVE VALUE of builds accruing to either side...
>
> Uniquely in the game ,
>
> ONLY IN THE AIR is there univerversality in production equivalents...so
> that production points spent in the air are more likely than in any other
> facet of the contest  to impact one's opponent more dramatically.
>
> Points spent on Airpower are always being expended on crt nr 1, by both
> sides, whatever the stage of the war....
>
> So in any situationof near parity, air combat is the most effective way to
> attrit one's opponent's productive capacity....
>
> If you are the weaker...logic dictates that you do not co-operate inthe
> attempts of your opponent to cash in his advantage in chips...
>
>
>
> -|steve|-
>
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