[WarInEur] Pro-German bias

[Don Lazov]

My take on all this is a bit different.
 
The Germans invented the strurm (strosstruppen) groups during WW1 to break into the trench lines. They developed this with small detachments (which morphed in WW2 to kampfgruppen) at the tactical unit level. They then took the new ideas invented by the British and French of mechanized and air warfare to the next level. The Brits went one way (infantry support) and the French another (both infantry support and use as cavalry). The Germans then morphed the concepts learned from WW1 (those to break the trenches that they had developed and those that were used against them-tanks) and applied them in the Polish campaign and then the lessons drew from this they also applied in France 1940 and Russia 1941. 
 
Another thing the Germans did really well at the beginning of the war (1939-42) was to make decisions on the spot by the commander at the front and to send by word of mouth any changes. By 1943 Hitler had more and more of a micro command and a lot of leaders were attrition off in the 1941-42 battles in Russia and North Africa or were fired. By 1944 only Hitler had control of the strategic command structure (theater level) and independent thinking was punished by death or removal. Only Manstein kept his post and only till April 1944. October 1943 till the end of the war on the eastern front resulted in both army group commanders having no freedom of action or were directed by Hitler to either hold the line at all costs (and if they failed to obey they were either relieved of command or shot).
 
By 1943 the Soviets had learned from the Germans the art of war and in 1942 they tried to emulate the German operational ideas but failed miserably which led to the development of their own operational art of war that fit their own model and methodologies. This was attacking in echelon (very narrow fronts packed with Divisions, the correct stacking in 1943-45 for the Russians should be changed from 3 Soviet units to 6 or more in a hex (pile on 6 x 5-5 Guards Corps to crush the German line with support from 4-6 x 10-1-10 Art divisions).
 
The Germans developed and perfected the blitzkrieg model from 1939-42 from 1943 onwards they shifted more or less to the kampfgruppen idea in defense of France, Germany and their eastern frontiers. The Soviets developed and perfected the Echelon Attack (or attacking in depth) from 1943-45. The Allies mostly used a form of Blitzkrieg type of operational art but with a very heavy emphasis on the massive use Air Power.
 
In the original game from SPI this was modeled by the 4 CRT. Also, the original game War in the East the idea was for the Germans to attack the massive Russian lines at 2-1 to 4-1 odds with high casualties (flipping 6-5’s) in mind.
 
Any way I am rambling we all know this shit right?

--
Don Lazov 
~Best Regards

-------------- Original message -------------- 
From: sgminfo <sgminfo at aol.com> 

> Chuck Sutherland wrote: 
> > Operational truth is operational truth, and blitzkrieg used combined arms and 
> speed to win battles. This truth has not changed, the balance of power between 
> weapon systems may have altered but the truth is the truth. And it was this 
> truth that the allied took along time to grasp and counter. Had the Germans been 
> able to supply their forces properly in Russia we would all have been speaking 
> German. 
> > 
> > They were not lucky, they just did their homework and got it right as far as 
> battle operations go. Fortunately for the world the allies had time and numbers 
> and production on their side and those forces simply ground down the Axis. 
> > 
> > Considering the allies knew what the Germans were going to do makes the case 
> for blitzkrieg even stronger. It would be like playing a basketball game and 
> giving the other team your playbook and signals and seeing now long it takes for 
> them to learn how to stop you. 
> > 
> > That operational prowess the German military used does not appear in the game 
> system as it stands now because you can mount an effective delaying battle 
> against the Germans. 
> > 
> > Early on that should not have been possible at least in the operational area 
> of the Panzer Corps. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> 
> One extract I read from a British officer's musings brought the lesson 
> home forcefully. 
> 
> His opinion, 
> In a nutshell, 
> 
> 
> The Germans were not particularly revolutionary, 
> much of this had all been worked out by 1918, 
> But they were very good at it. 
> 
> Lower formations had simple opening book approaches in standard 
> predictable ways, 
> the revolutionary aspect of this was that commanders in the Wehrmacht 
> were rehearsed in this, 
> and thus could place reliance on other units behaving in predictable ways, 
> ways that could be hooked up to and allow larger, 
> and more complex plans to take shape and be made manifest, 
> The general allied reaction allowed far too much low level ad hoc 
> battleplay, 
> to the point that the multiplying complications 
> outran the ability and the experience of the field officers to cordinate 
> their units. 
> 
> i.e. experience and familiarity told heavily against us. 
> 
> Once we had learned the moves, 
> their approach perversely played into our hands, 
> as that very predictability enabled low level counter measures to 
> operate with confidence and gusto. 
> 
> So, it then became a battle environment which our field commanders could 
> follow and thereby operate in, without groping around in the dark. 
> 
> In 1940 many battles were not won by the Germans. they were lost by the 
> allies, once things got a bit fluid and confusing, our commanders could 
> not see the forest and the big picture, and once that sight had been 
> lost the thread of the action went with it. 
> 
> In the Western Desert Ritchie and other British commanders fell into 
> this trap. When Rommel was forced to retreat the first time, it was only 
> the timely stepping in of the vastly more experienced theatre commander 
> that prevented the Army commanders from acknowledging (erroneously) that 
> they were beaten and withdrawing in confusion. 
> 
> Pondering this, you can then understand why the changing unit strength 
> options is such a useful mod. Churchill was bedeviled by it, he saw the 
> 8-10s lined up (he knew the ration and toe's). But unlike in the game, 
> he could not see that his wonderfull 8-10 was in fact a 5-10, or 6-10 
> instead. Many basic actions went awry because of such a simple, but 
> devastating overvaluation of our actual capabilities of the time. 
> 
> Later in the War similar miscalculations as to capabilities and actual 
> fighting performance led directly to many desasters in 1944-45 under 
> Hitler's gaze. Mortain and Falaise were prime examples of this, a 
> fundamental misappraisal of the physical and organisational capabilities 
> of the German Army, when faced with an adverse balance of circumstance 
> and forces., a misapprehension not shared by commanders more directly 
> linked to their fighting formations. 
> 
> 
> 
> -|steve|- 
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