[WarInEur] RE: WarInEur Digest, Vol 43, Issue 15

Mon Feb 25 11:22:24 EST 2008

1) Thanks for all the nice things you guys are saying about my post

2) What Kent called my House rule was a comrpromise to resolve a contradiction. There used to be
a flat out official rule prohibiting an At Peace USSR from building corps from smaller units.  And yet the 
real world USSR has 12 x 4-4 on line at the start of Barbarossa.  Given the production times involved 
involved, the 4-4s appearing on 0/8/41 we started on 0/6/41  which is after the inspection of 4/5-41 to see whether the USSR has met its deployement requirements. 
A rule prohibiting the depleting of the Frontier Garrisons seems to be simply one way to interpret the deployment requirements in a game in which units being converted are no longer specifically assigned 
to a training center with a specifiable geographic location. Since units are taken off the map for production 
purposes, it makes perfect sense to regard such units as no longer fulfilling a deployment requirement. 
Lets look at some undeniable facts: 
a) In WitE there is no provision for conversion of the Siberian Army into Corps as a production event. 
b) In the 1941 set up there are a specified number of units on the map and a specified number of 
Production points remaining. 
c) The rules for limited War production and the initial pools allow for an overbuild, especially if the USSR
does not have to create the 7 AP the Germans shot up in the opening week of Barbarossa. 
d) Using the rules it is possible not only to build more units than the 1941 set up calls for but also to do 
so on an accellerated schedule (smart vs dumb production)  However, some of these technigues can play 
a little fast and lose with the deployment requirements IMHO. 
e)  The Soviets suffered tremendous losses during the Winter War 

The basic theme of CWIE needs to remain that the Soviet Union stayed AT PEACE, did fight the abstract
WINTER WAR,  and organized its forces so as to meet the 5/41 Deployment requirements.  

To me this means that CWIE-2 should include a reverse-engineered time table for a quasi-historical 
deployment.   Carl has this right.  The main idea should be to get the Historical units on map & on time
and then have deductions so the USSR is progressively weaker depending on when the Invasion comes. 
The Siberian conversions are paid for some time prior to july 1941.  Perhaps there should also be some 
rule against 4-4 Corps creation to hold down the number of sucessfull fortifications outside the boundaries
of the Prewar USSR. 

I would further propose that this basic deployment format assumes that RW Winter War Casualties consume the "missing" Arms and Personnel points;t (hat is, any thing not needed to get from 1939 to 1941 is removed from the initial pools.  As a matter of fact, it might be fair to suspend production of new units temporarily
to reflect the period in which a portion of the Soviet Army was temporarily unavailable to fight Turkey, Rumania or Hungary, let alone Nazi Germany.

AS AN OPTION instead of this historical straight jacket the Soviet player could be given control over production, a loose set of deployment requirements, and allowed to shuffle the Soviets's counters even while remaining at peace. (This allows for Smart production and potentially a stronger USSR for the Axis to deal with) . 
POINTS OF DISCUSSION for this optional module 
1) How many AP does the USSR start with and on what schedule must more be built?                           
2) When and how may Corps be converted?
3) How many of the extra arms and personnel points should be eliminated or deferred until Total War?
4) Should the Limited War rules be changed if the nation the USSR attacks is unalighned 
such as Finland, Turkey, or Sweden. 

As a Further Option: The Winter War can be assighned a production or casualty value. If there is no winter
War the USSR has more military resources.  

As a Further Option, the price of not fighting the Winter War could be either a blanket ban on Corps conversions until 1942 (other than the Siberians) or Soviet units having minor ZOC instead of major 
ZOC for the First 2 Cycles of Total War. 

Bob in Louisville 
PS.   As a game balance consideration, the Axis advantage of invading early is largely canceled if
the Soviets are able to deploy (read Dig in) so as to deny RR conversions. Given that an experienced 
Axis player will add Paratroopers, Amphibious langings, and Motorized infantry to his arsenal the 
Soviet over-build probably seems like a fair thing.  
I suppose my problem with the over-build is that I NEVER PLAY without the Severe Weather supply restrictions and the auto AEX rule. My Soviets have bigger problems in the 2nd summer than they do in the first. They don't really need the extra infantry in 1941 as much as they need a head start on making 8-6 and 9-6s for 1942.  

> Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2008 16:45:37 -0500> From: Carl Rupp <carlaugustruppsr at aol.com>> Subject: Re: [WarInEur] RE: Soviet pre-barbarossa deployments WARDALL CLARK> > An excellent point about the impact of the Winter War on the Soviet > forces. According to www.winterwar.com the Soviet casualties were > 127,000 killed and 265,000 wounded. Plus another 800 dead pilots, which > equates to several hundred airplanes. www.wikepedia.org confirms those > numbers and mentions the loss of 2,300 tanks. All together, I think that > would amount to a quite a few dozen 1-4s, many 2-5s and APs.> > Plus, if you let the Russians change their pre-war build up, why not the > Germans? And why not provide an option where the Germans drop their > anti-Jewish actions and free up divisions that were stationed in > concentration camp? And how about given them a full war economy > earlier?. And why not this, and that, and the other thing.> > If people choose to play somewhat historically, with the Russians > neutral and not controlled by the Allies at peace, they should get the > equivalent of the 1941 Barbarossa deployment. If you want to build the > Russians up, play with the Allieds controlling the Russians from turn 1.> > Using the Barbarossa 41 campaign game as a starting point, a quick and > approximate way to do the historical Russians, which would work for any > 1941 German attack, would be to have the Russians start with the 1/7/41 > deployment, but deduct the 25 personnel and 49 arms points from the > starting Russian production pools for each cycle the attack is prior to > 7/41 and build in the reinforcements that are slated to arrive in cycle > 8, 9, and 10. Add in 8 4-4s, 4 3-5s, 8 0-1-10s at the 8th cycle for > additional reinforcements, 4 4-4s, 4 2-5s, 4 0-1-10s at the 9th cycle > for additional reinforcements, and 2 APs at the 10th cycle.> > Yes, this does put into place the Russian the units that would have been > produced in the 7th cycle a tad early, but not that much to make a > difference IMHO. And if you are that concerned, deduct a dozen 1-4s and > a handful of 2-5s around Moscow and have them come in on the 7th cycle > and you will get what you want.> > That's my two cents.> > Carl> >> > Wardall Clark wrote:> >> 1) Given that the Germans may choose to invade the USSR at any time after > >> sept 1930 in CWIE there> >> has to be some provision for soviet deployments before and after 1/7/41. > >> Kudo's to the guys working to> >> pre-program CWIE-2 to allow for this.> >> 2) Kent listed quite a few more units than I can usually produce with > >> Soviet Pre-8/41 resources. The principle descrepancy is Air Points: The > >> USSR had ten AP by 1/7/41. These cost Arms Points which would> >> be better spent on Anti-tank units. The second limitation is two > >> guidelines I impose via the Louisville> >> interpretation of the mishmash of rules regarding pre-barbarossa USSR.> >> One "rule" we scrupulously obey is that units in production do not > >> count as units on map for purposes of deployment requirements--this > >> drastically curtails the available cadre for large unit production. My > >> second "rule" is that until the 5/41 requirements are met, no corps may > >> be created by an at peace USSR except for the Siberian Forces.> >> With no 4-4's on the map the Soviets are limited to 3 infantry points > >> per hex, which means that one> >> did attempt per clear weather turn results in an average of one > >> fortification BUILT per TWO clear weather turns. Since the Soviets don't > >> occupy Besabarabia until 1940, if the Germans invade in the SPRING> >> of 1941 there simply cannot be all that many 0-3-0s in the frontier > >> regions at the time of the invasion.> >> One additional "source" of Production Points is the cost of > >> converting 36 1-4 deployed in Siberia in 1939> >> into 12 x 5-5 that can begin appearing on Map in November of 1941. It > >> seems to me to be a matter of common sense that these points should not > >> be spent until the last possible cycle, so that other units may> >> appear on the map sooner. However, in the 1941 set up these points have > >> already been allocated. I suppose my point is that there are are smart > >> ways, and there are Historical ways that Soviet Production> >> may be directed in the cycles proceding 1/7/41 and these are not the same > >> at all. 3) The Winter War is a critical missing element in looking at the > >> growth of the Soviet Army. The USSR got> >> clobbered in its initial invasion. Which means a bunch of 1-4s some 2-5s > >> and 3-5s and maybe some AP went down in flames and should be removed from > >> the Map. If there are production points unaccounted for in the 1/7/41 set > >> up, then the Winter War is the almost certain explanation.> >> 4. Given the difficulty of the Soviet task in War in the East, Creating > >> a game in which the Germans may> >> make this task vastly more difficult by invading 6 weeks sooner really > >> does turn the central theme of> >> WitE upside down. CWIE is about how much better can the Axis do than > >> they did historical. John has this> >> right.> >> 5) Fog of War and secret production go a long way to explaining why > >> Stalin was caught off guard in 1941.> >> The whole world knew that Axis forces were pouring into the Balkins in > >> the spring and early summer. Did the> >> world also know that this was a small fraction of the Available Wermacht? > >> If I was the Axis Supreme Commander and I planned to invade the USSR, my > >> attack would be launched several weeks before 1/7/41 to get the maximum > >> possible good weather to work with. Is it not possible that> >> Stalin reasoned that with "the witching hour" having passed, he was safe > >> for another year because the Axis> >> main theatre of operations for 1941 was going to be the Mediterranean?> >> 6) The Turkish trigger rule is not only vitally necessary to game > >> balance, it is also may have an historical> >> basis: While turkey isn't mentioned in the written Molotov -Von > >> Ribbontrof agreement, there may have been> >> a verbal understanding that Turkey, or at least Eastern Turkey was to be > >> part of the Soviet sphere of> >> influence. A german invasion of Turkey would have be regarded as a mortal > >> threat just was would any> >> axis invasion of Finland (triggering Total War Production and > >> mobilization.)> >>> >> 7. The missing Ukrainian RR do indeed make a first summer southern MAIN > >> thrust impractical. The Axis> >> can accomplish so much more north of the Great marsh that by comparison > >> the Ukraine is a waste of> >> soldiers. Hitler wanted the Ukraine for economic reasons that generally > >> are not reflected in the game. His> >> generals counsuled that seizing these areas added little or nothing to > >> the German economy unless they> >> could subsequently be held and protected--AND TO DO TH AT THE SOVIET ARMY > >> HAD TO BE DEFEATED.> >> In 1941 the battles of Smolenzk and Kiev so depleted the Soviet Army > >> that they could not defend> >> Leningrad, AND Moscow, and the Ukraine. They made a choice not to > >> seriously contest the Ukraine, which enabled Von Rumsted's AG to roll all > >> the way to Vorishilov and Rostov. I persist in believing that OKH had> >> this one right. Task one was destroying the Red Army and Moscow with its > >> rail juntions and Production centers was the target that would bring the > >> retreating Soviets to battle. Where they were wrong was in believing that > >> they would win that battle in October and November of 1941. > >> Historically, the Axis extended the missing Bucharest to Odessa rail line > >> only far enough to supply the> >> 11th Army's Crimean campaign. The Stalingrad Campaign was supplied via a > >> single rail line coming from> >> poland and crossing the Dnieper at Dnepropetrvosk. NOrth-South rail > >> transit was impossible and this is a BIG reason why the Soviets > >> Stalingrad counteroffensive was ultimately so successful.> ------------------------------> > Message: 2> Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2008 16:22:27 -0600> From: "Kent & Sue Haunschild" <kentsue at cox.net>> Subject: Re: [WarInEur] RE: Soviet pre-barbarossa deployments CARL RUPP> > Carl makes a point, except the rules provided by the game designers provide > a mechanism for peacetime production. If you follow these rules the Soviets > are going to be much stronger than without peacetime production. Since we > must code the existing game rules into CWIE2 we are not left with much > choice. The Winter War is not fought, if it was the Soviets would have been > at Limited War, had increased levels of arms and personnel points available > for the duration of the war, and gotten their hands on 1/2 of the Total War > Stock piles. This would have made a bad situation worse. CWIE2 makes the > Winter War a defacto event.> > I raised this problem of Soviet Peace time Production with the List several > months ago. The only solution I saw was to reduce the prewar pools to the > amounts required to produce the 2-5-41 OOB, the Siberians, and the published > builds in progress. My proposal met with Zero success and I was once again > branded as a panzer pusher for even suggesting that the design pools are too > large and need to be reduced.> > So what I am suggesting at this time is to produce both sets of wsu files > and let the players check off which files sets they want to use. Players > will always be free to select Soviets active at Peace and play each turn for > themselves. The WSU files are meant to be a player aid and eliminate some > of the tedium. Not a requirement that they must play with.> > Kent> > >> > Wardall Clark wrote:> >> 1) Given that the Germans may choose to invade the USSR at any time after > >> sept 1930 in CWIE there> >> has to be some provision for soviet deployments before and after 1/7/41. > >> Kudo's to the guys working to> >> pre-program CWIE-2 to allow for this.> >> 2) Kent listed quite a few more units than I can usually produce with > >> Soviet Pre-8/41 resources. The principle descrepancy is Air Points: The > >> USSR had ten AP by 1/7/41. These cost Arms Points which would> >> be better spent on Anti-tank units. The second limitation is two > >> guidelines I impose via the Louisville> >> interpretation of the mishmash of rules regarding pre-barbarossa USSR.> >> One "rule" we scrupulously obey is that units in production do not > >> count as units on map for purposes of deployment requirements--this > >> drastically curtails the available cadre for large unit production. My > >> second "rule" is that until the 5/41 requirements are met, no corps may > >> be created by an at peace USSR except for the Siberian Forces.> >> With no 4-4's on the map the Soviets are limited to 3 infantry points > >> per hex, which means that one> >> did attempt per clear weather turn results in an average of one > >> fortification BUILT per TWO clear weather turns. Since the Soviets don't > >> occupy Besabarabia until 1940, if the Germans invade in the SPRING> >> of 1941 there simply cannot be all that many 0-3-0s in the frontier > >> regions at the time of the invasion.> >> One additional "source" of Production Points is the cost of > >> converting 36 1-4 deployed in Siberia in 1939> >> into 12 x 5-5 that can begin appearing on Map in November of 1941. It > >> seems to me to be a matter of common sense that these points should not > >> be spent until the last possible cycle, so that other units may> >> appear on the map sooner. However, in the 1941 set up these points have > >> already been allocated. I suppose my point is that there are are smart > >> ways, and there are Historical ways that Soviet Production> >> may be directed in the cycles proceding 1/7/41 and these are not the same > >> at all. 3) The Winter War is a critical missing element in looking at the > >> growth of the Soviet Army. The USSR got> >> clobbered in its initial invasion. Which means a bunch of 1-4s some 2-5s > >> and 3-5s and maybe some AP went down in flames and should be removed from > >> the Map. If there are production points unaccounted for in the 1/7/41 set > >> up, then the Winter War is the almost certain explanation.> >> 4. Given the difficulty of the Soviet task in War in the East, Creating > >> a game in which the Germans may> >> make this task vastly more difficult by invading 6 weeks sooner really > >> does turn the central theme of> >> WitE upside down. CWIE is about how much better can the Axis do than > >> they did historical. John has this> >> right.> >> 5) Fog of War and secret production go a long way to explaining why > >> Stalin was caught off guard in 1941.> >> The whole world knew that Axis forces were pouring into the Balkins in > >> the spring and early summer. Did the> >> world also know that this was a small fraction of the Available Wermacht? > >> If I was the Axis Supreme Commander and I planned to invade the USSR, my > >> attack would be launched several weeks before 1/7/41 to get the maximum > >> possible good weather to work with. Is it not possible that> >> Stalin reasoned that with "the witching hour" having passed, he was safe > >> for another year because the Axis> >> main theatre of operations for 1941 was going to be the Mediterranean?> >> 6) The Turkish trigger rule is not only vitally necessary to game > >> balance, it is also may have an historical> >> basis: While turkey isn't mentioned in the written Molotov -Von > >> Ribbontrof agreement, there may have been> >> a verbal understanding that Turkey, or at least Eastern Turkey was to be > >> part of the Soviet sphere of> >> influence. A german invasion of Turkey would have be regarded as a mortal > >> threat just was would any> >> axis invasion of Finland (triggering Total War Production and > >> mobilization.)> >>> >> 7. The missing Ukrainian RR do indeed make a first summer southern MAIN > >> thrust impractical. The Axis> >> can accomplish so much more north of the Great marsh that by comparison > >> the Ukraine is a waste of> >> soldiers. Hitler wanted the Ukraine for economic reasons that generally > >> are not reflected in the game. His> >> generals counsuled that seizing these areas added little or nothing to > >> the German economy unless they> >> could subsequently be held and protected--AND TO DO TH AT THE SOVIET ARMY > >> HAD TO BE DEFEATED.> >> In 1941 the battles of Smolenzk and Kiev so depleted the Soviet Army > >> that they could not defend> >> Leningrad, AND Moscow, and the Ukraine. They made a choice not to > >> seriously contest the Ukraine, which enabled Von Rumsted's AG to roll all > >> the way to Vorishilov and Rostov. I persist in believing that OKH had> >> this one right. Task one was destroying the Red Army and Moscow with its > >> rail juntions and Production centers was the target that would bring the > >> retreating Soviets to battle. Where they were wrong was in believing that > >> they would win that battle in October and November of 1941. > >> Historically, the Axis extended the missing Bucharest to Odessa rail line > >> only far enough to supply the> >> 11th Army's Crimean campaign. The Stalingrad Campaign was supplied via a > >> single rail line coming from> >> poland and crossing the Dnieper at Dnepropetrvosk. NOrth-South rail > >> transit was impossible and this is a BIG reason why the Soviets > >> Stalingrad counteroffensive was ultimately so successful.> >>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------> >> Helping your favorite cause is as easy as instant messaging. You IM, we > >> give. Learn more. > >> <http://im.live.com/Messenger/IM/Home/?source=text_hotmail_join>=> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------> >>> >> _______________________________________________> >> WarInEur mailing list> >> WarInEur at mailman.halisp.net> >> http://mailman.halisp.net/mailman/listinfo/warineur> >>> >> > _______________________________________________> > WarInEur mailing list> > WarInEur at mailman.halisp.net> > http://mailman.halisp.net/mailman/listinfo/warineur> > > > > > > ------------------------------> > Message: 3> Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2008 17:43:40 -0500> From: Carl Rupp <carlaugustruppsr at aol.com>> Subject: Re: [WarInEur] RE: Soviet pre-barbarossa deployments> To: Kent & Sue Haunschild kentsue at cox.net> > I agree. You can't argue with freedom of choice, though I am sure > someone will. If each player gets to choose from the options (historical > with Winter War or alternative optomized without the Winter War) then > each player can offer and accept such challenges on whatever terms they > see fit. Sounds like a good end point to me! But I am sure someone will > continue the thread.....> > Carl
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