[WarInEur] RE: Soviet pre-barbarossa deployments

[Carl Rupp]

An excellent point about the impact of the Winter War on the Soviet 
forces. According to www.winterwar.com the Soviet casualties were 
127,000 killed and 265,000 wounded. Plus another 800 dead pilots, which 
equates to several hundred airplanes.  www.wikepedia.org confirms those 
numbers and mentions the loss of 2,300 tanks. All together, I think that 
would amount to a quite a few dozen 1-4s, many 2-5s and APs.

Plus, if you let the Russians change their pre-war build up, why not the 
Germans? And why not provide an option where the Germans drop their 
anti-Jewish actions and free up divisions that were stationed in 
concentration camp? And how about given them a full war economy 
earlier?. And why not this, and that, and the other thing.

If people choose to play somewhat historically, with the Russians 
neutral and not controlled by the Allies at peace, they should get the 
equivalent of the 1941 Barbarossa deployment. If you want to build the 
Russians up, play with the Allieds controlling the Russians from turn 1.

Using the Barbarossa 41 campaign game as a starting point, a quick and 
approximate way to do the historical Russians, which would work for any 
1941 German attack, would be to have the Russians start with the 1/7/41 
deployment, but deduct the 25 personnel and 49 arms points from the 
starting Russian production pools for each cycle the attack is prior to 
7/41 and build in the reinforcements that are slated to arrive in cycle 
8, 9, and 10. Add in 8 4-4s, 4 3-5s, 8 0-1-10s at the 8th cycle for 
additional reinforcements, 4 4-4s, 4 2-5s, 4 0-1-10s at the 9th cycle 
for additional reinforcements, and 2 APs at the 10th cycle.

Yes, this does put into place the Russian the units that would have been 
produced in the 7th cycle a tad early, but not that much to make a 
difference IMHO. And if you are that concerned, deduct a dozen 1-4s and 
a handful of 2-5s around Moscow and have them come in on the 7th cycle 
and you will get what you want.

That's my two cents.

Carl

Wardall Clark wrote:
> 1) Given that the Germans may choose to invade the USSR at any time 
> after sept 1930 in CWIE there
> has to be some provision for soviet deployments before and after 
> 1/7/41.  Kudo's to the guys working to
> pre-program CWIE-2 to allow for this.
>  
> 2) Kent listed quite a few more units than I can usually produce with 
> Soviet Pre-8/41 resources.  The principle descrepancy is Air Points: 
> The USSR had ten AP by 1/7/41. These cost Arms Points which would
> be better spent on Anti-tank units.  The second limitation is two 
> guidelines I impose via the Louisville
> interpretation of the mishmash of rules regarding pre-barbarossa USSR.
>       One "rule" we scrupulously obey is that units in production do 
> not count as units on map for purposes of deployment 
> requirements--this drastically curtails the available cadre for large 
> unit production.  My second "rule" is that until the 5/41 requirements 
> are met, no corps may be created by an at peace USSR except for the 
> Siberian Forces.
>    With no 4-4's on the map the Soviets are limited to 3 infantry 
> points per hex, which means that one
> did attempt per clear weather turn results in an average of one 
> fortification BUILT per TWO clear weather turns. Since the Soviets 
> don't occupy Besabarabia until 1940, if the Germans invade in the SPRING
> of 1941 there simply cannot be all that many 0-3-0s in the frontier 
> regions at the time of the invasion.
>       One additional "source" of Production Points is the cost of 
> converting 36 1-4 deployed in Siberia in 1939
> into 12 x 5-5 that can begin appearing on Map in November of 1941. It 
> seems to me to be a matter of common sense that these points should 
> not be spent until the last possible cycle, so that other units may
> appear on the map sooner. However, in the 1941 set up these points 
> have already been allocated. 
>     I suppose my point is that there are are smart ways, and there are 
> Historical ways that Soviet Production
> may be directed in the cycles proceding 1/7/41 and these are not the 
> same at all. 
>  
> 3) The Winter War is a critical missing element in looking at the 
> growth of the Soviet Army.  The USSR got
> clobbered in its initial invasion. Which means a bunch of 1-4s some 
> 2-5s and 3-5s and maybe some AP went down in flames and should be 
> removed from the Map. If there are production points unaccounted for 
> in the 1/7/41 set up, then the Winter War is the almost certain 
> explanation.
>  
> 4. Given the difficulty of the Soviet task in War in the East, 
> Creating a game in which the Germans may
> make this task vastly more difficult by invading 6 weeks sooner really 
> does turn the central theme of
> WitE upside down.  CWIE is about how much better can the Axis do than 
> they did historical. John has this
> right.
>  
> 5) Fog of War and secret production go a long way to explaining why 
> Stalin was caught off guard in 1941.
> The whole world knew that Axis forces were pouring into the Balkins in 
> the spring and early summer. Did the
> world also know that this was a small fraction of the Available 
> Wermacht? 
>      If I was the Axis Supreme Commander and I planned to invade the 
> USSR, my attack would be launched several weeks before 1/7/41 to get 
> the maximum possible good weather to work with.  Is it not possible that
> Stalin reasoned that with "the witching hour" having passed, he was 
> safe for another year because the Axis
> main theatre of operations for 1941 was going to be the Mediterranean?
>  
> 6) The Turkish trigger rule is not only vitally necessary to game 
> balance, it is also may have an historical
> basis: While turkey isn't mentioned in the written Molotov -Von 
> Ribbontrof agreement, there may have been
> a verbal understanding that Turkey, or at least Eastern Turkey was to 
> be part of the Soviet sphere of
> influence. A german invasion of Turkey would have be regarded as a 
> mortal threat just was would any
> axis invasion of Finland (triggering Total War Production and 
> mobilization.)
>
> 7.  The missing Ukrainian RR do indeed make a first summer southern 
> MAIN thrust impractical.  The Axis
> can accomplish so much more north of the Great marsh that by 
> comparison the Ukraine is a waste of
> soldiers.  Hitler wanted the Ukraine for economic reasons that 
> generally are not reflected in the game. His
> generals counsuled that seizing these areas added little or nothing to 
> the German economy unless they
> could subsequently be held and protected--AND TO DO TH AT THE SOVIET 
> ARMY HAD TO BE DEFEATED.
>      In 1941 the battles of Smolenzk and Kiev so depleted the Soviet 
> Army that they could not defend
> Leningrad, AND Moscow, and the Ukraine. They made a choice not to 
> seriously contest the Ukraine, which enabled Von Rumsted's AG to roll 
> all the way to Vorishilov and Rostov.  I persist in believing that OKH had
> this one right. Task one was destroying the Red Army and Moscow with 
> its rail juntions and Production centers was the target that would 
> bring the retreating Soviets to battle. Where they were wrong was in 
> believing that they would win that battle in October and November of 
> 1941.  
>     Historically, the Axis extended the missing Bucharest to Odessa 
> rail line only far enough to supply the
> 11th Army's Crimean campaign.  The Stalingrad Campaign was supplied 
> via a single rail line coming from
> poland and crossing the Dnieper at Dnepropetrvosk.  NOrth-South rail 
> transit was impossible and this is a BIG reason why the Soviets 
> Stalingrad counteroffensive was ultimately so successful.
>  
>  
>
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