[WarInEur] RE: Soviet pre-barbarossa deployments

[Wardall Clark]

1) Given that the Germans may choose to invade the USSR at any time after sept 1930 in CWIE there 
has to be some provision for soviet deployments before and after 1/7/41.  Kudo's to the guys working to
pre-program CWIE-2 to allow for this. 
 
2) Kent listed quite a few more units than I can usually produce with Soviet Pre-8/41 resources.  The principle descrepancy is Air Points: The USSR had ten AP by 1/7/41. These cost Arms Points which would 
be better spent on Anti-tank units.  The second limitation is two guidelines I impose via the Louisville 
interpretation of the mishmash of rules regarding pre-barbarossa USSR. 
      One "rule" we scrupulously obey is that units in production do not count as units on map for purposes of deployment requirements--this drastically curtails the available cadre for large unit production.  My second "rule" is that until the 5/41 requirements are met, no corps may be created by an at peace USSR except for the Siberian Forces. 
   With no 4-4's on the map the Soviets are limited to 3 infantry points per hex, which means that one 
did attempt per clear weather turn results in an average of one fortification BUILT per TWO clear weather turns. Since the Soviets don't occupy Besabarabia until 1940, if the Germans invade in the SPRING
of 1941 there simply cannot be all that many 0-3-0s in the frontier regions at the time of the invasion. 
      One additional "source" of Production Points is the cost of converting 36 1-4 deployed in Siberia in 1939
into 12 x 5-5 that can begin appearing on Map in November of 1941. It seems to me to be a matter of common sense that these points should not be spent until the last possible cycle, so that other units may 
appear on the map sooner. However, in the 1941 set up these points have already been allocated.  
    I suppose my point is that there are are smart ways, and there are Historical ways that Soviet Production 
may be directed in the cycles proceding 1/7/41 and these are not the same at all.  
 
3) The Winter War is a critical missing element in looking at the growth of the Soviet Army.  The USSR got
clobbered in its initial invasion. Which means a bunch of 1-4s some 2-5s and 3-5s and maybe some AP went down in flames and should be removed from the Map. If there are production points unaccounted for in the 1/7/41 set up, then the Winter War is the almost certain explanation. 
 
4. Given the difficulty of the Soviet task in War in the East, Creating a game in which the Germans may 
make this task vastly more difficult by invading 6 weeks sooner really does turn the central theme of 
WitE upside down.  CWIE is about how much better can the Axis do than they did historical. John has this 
right. 
 
5) Fog of War and secret production go a long way to explaining why Stalin was caught off guard in 1941. 
The whole world knew that Axis forces were pouring into the Balkins in the spring and early summer. Did the 
world also know that this was a small fraction of the Available Wermacht?  
     If I was the Axis Supreme Commander and I planned to invade the USSR, my attack would be launched several weeks before 1/7/41 to get the maximum possible good weather to work with.  Is it not possible that
Stalin reasoned that with "the witching hour" having passed, he was safe for another year because the Axis 
main theatre of operations for 1941 was going to be the Mediterranean? 
 
6) The Turkish trigger rule is not only vitally necessary to game balance, it is also may have an historical 
basis: While turkey isn't mentioned in the written Molotov -Von Ribbontrof agreement, there may have been
a verbal understanding that Turkey, or at least Eastern Turkey was to be part of the Soviet sphere of 
influence. A german invasion of Turkey would have be regarded as a mortal threat just was would any
axis invasion of Finland (triggering Total War Production and mobilization.) 
7.  The missing Ukrainian RR do indeed make a first summer southern MAIN thrust impractical.  The Axis 
can accomplish so much more north of the Great marsh that by comparison the Ukraine is a waste of 
soldiers.  Hitler wanted the Ukraine for economic reasons that generally are not reflected in the game. His 
generals counsuled that seizing these areas added little or nothing to the German economy unless they 
could subsequently be held and protected--AND TO DO TH AT THE SOVIET ARMY HAD TO BE DEFEATED. 
     In 1941 the battles of Smolenzk and Kiev so depleted the Soviet Army that they could not defend
Leningrad, AND Moscow, and the Ukraine. They made a choice not to seriously contest the Ukraine, which enabled Von Rumsted's AG to roll all the way to Vorishilov and Rostov.  I persist in believing that OKH had
this one right. Task one was destroying the Red Army and Moscow with its rail juntions and Production centers was the target that would bring the retreating Soviets to battle. Where they were wrong was in believing that they would win that battle in October and November of 1941.   
    Historically, the Axis extended the missing Bucharest to Odessa rail line only far enough to supply the 
11th Army's Crimean campaign.  The Stalingrad Campaign was supplied via a single rail line coming from 
poland and crossing the Dnieper at Dnepropetrvosk.  NOrth-South rail transit was impossible and this is a BIG reason why the Soviets Stalingrad counteroffensive was ultimately so successful.
 
 
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