[WarInEur] Pro German Bias

Mon Feb 4 08:49:37 EST 2008

-----Original Message-----
From: warineur-bounces at mailman.halisp.net [mailto:warineur-bounces at mailman.halisp.net] On Behalf Of Buckley, John D.
Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 4:34 AM
To: warineur at mailman.halisp.net
Subject: [WarInEur] Pro German Bias

I am intrigued by what everyone here is calling blitzkrieg. All seem to be accepting that the Germans had a plan or model which was 'blitzkrieg'. I would like to see the evidence upon whihc this assupmtion is being based because the reality is that there was no new model, or set of tactics that conformed to a 'blitzkrieg' plan or model, and no economic organisation to allow short campaigns so as not to put too much pressure on the German economy. Likewise the Luftwaffe had no widespread or dedicated army support model; less than 10% of the Luftwaffe was considered army support and Luftwaffe officers really wanted to push for a strategic bombing model and a fully independent role.
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Chuck replies:
Well they did a very good job of faking it then didn't they, I suppose those Stuka Dive Bombers were Strategic in nature then? ;) As for evidence, France 1940 the allies meet the Germans based on last wars tactics, the Germans using the truth about combined arms and speed crush them in six weeks. Of course we can blame the RAF or Churchhill for this but the TRUTH is that the operational use of speed and firepower totally disrupted the command and control of the allied forces and did not allow them to coordinate their forces in a timely fashion. Day late and a Dollar short as my Grandfather would say saw HQ's almost overrun, and assembly points for the new defensive position already taken before the defenders could arrive.

Napoleon did the same thing in his time, speed, speed, speed, to position yourself to win the battle and throw the enemy off balance. Flank movement to disrupt the enemy positions and effect their ability to respond. And focused firepower and mass to effect the breakthrough into the interior of the enemy position and force him to run because staying either was a ticket to death or prison camp. Different war, different elements in use, same truth!

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The German armed forces made the most of what they had, the deal dealt them by Hitler's foreign policy and stuttering military-economic expansion. They had thought about the lessons of the First World War, but in essence they carried on with the same classical Prussian/German approach or fast encirclements and manoeuvre as the key to success.
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Chuck replies:
And that IS the KEY to success, Napoleon did it, and they did it, one used legs the other tanks and troop carriers! Its not a Prussian approach it is truth on the battlefield, armies see it sometimes or learn in during war, but the truth stays the same. You cut off the armies ability to supply and control itself and then you let it die trying to escape while it is out of balance tactically and you are not.

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 Limited mechanisation and motorisation allowed them to do this against the slow reacting and static defensive enemies they encountered until 1942. Once the Soviets and Western Allies started to be able to dictate terms and drive operations and battles according to their strengths - essentially firepower - the Germans were stuffed and had no real answer to it.
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Chuck replies:
This is not completely true the Soviets attacked and attacked and attacked in 41, they did not have the coordination or concentration or firepower to equal the Germans and the Germans used that ability to react to the attacks and crush them. The Western allies dictated terms only after they had gained equality/superiority in the air and superior strength and logistics on the ground, adding to that Hitler's static orders and you have a transition from the German army being the faster of the two to being the slower.

The Soviets attacked the problem differently, they used numbers and depth along with a mobile reserve to meet the Germans and wear them down. They applied firepower but lacked the mobility advantage till 44. Hitler's no retreat orders effected the East also forcing the Germans to have to take the initial massed artillery attacks and not being able to give ground and react in a mobile fashion. Add to this the large area to defend and the Soviets could always either make a hole or find a hole.

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It's also worth bearing in mind that although the Germans were very good at manoeuvre war (bewegungskrieg?) they were rubbish at most other aspects of campaign/multi-operational level management - intelligence, logistics, operational sequencing, development of strategy, matching capability to resources and so on.
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Chuck replies:
That is partially the blame of the civilian dictatorship is it not? And again it was good enough to beat the hell out of everyone early on!
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In addition, the much lauded concept of mission based command (auftragstaktiks?) was good in the short-medium term but became much less of an asset when strong operational- strategic level control was required to ensure that available assets and resources were deployed to the key areas; a lower level commander wasn't able to see the big picture and allowing commanders to achieve objectives as they saw fit and because they could, was counterproductive in an army running out of steam and resources, and unable to match low level objectives to the broader strategic goals.
Finally, the German army did a very good job in the post-war era blaming everyone else for their defeat - the Luftwaffe, the Allies for having too much equipment and resources, and of course, Hitler. Very few  said that they had screwed up, made bad choices and that they had for much of the time supported Hitler's strategies.
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Chuck replies:
Gee can't be Hitler after all the 262 was ready when 41 I think? Or DOW America in Dec 41 now that was a brilliant move on his part! Lets say that 262 is rushed into production in 41 and is flying cap in late 42 early 43 and the allies can't hold the air advantage. What happens during D-Day? What happens in many battles where mobility was the key? So I would say part of the blame is the air control situation.

Taking on most of the world at one time is going to get you beaten no matter how good your military is. Did the ground forces make mistakes sure, but man for man in a fight they were better then their opponents and that is what I judge them by.

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During the war senior military commanders at OKH and OKW often sided with Hitler and not just for sycophantic reasons; most said after the war that it had all been Hitler's fault and if only they'd been properly backed with resources and sound grand-strategic direction. The obvious point, even if in conjecture and as a counter-factual, is that if the German army had had such support and wasn't pushed into desperate situations requiring big gambles, it wouldn't have been the army it was; it would have functioned much more like its opponents, who ultimately found the solution to successfully dealing with the Germans.
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Use numbers and wear them down, yes that worked much like Grant did in 64, I hardly call it brilliant though, a sure win but not brilliant!

As for siding with Hitler, if you wanted to live and stay employed it was your only choice!

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How does this relate to WinE? Well, I actually agree that the Germans should have more dynamism at the start to simulate the slower reactive capabilities of the Allies, but let's not think this should be rolled out across the game simply because the German army was the German army. There are also aspects of the game at the strategic level that might simulate the German state a bit more that get missed. One could argue that as Hitler's policy was to avoid putting pressure on the German state unless it was necessary, the German economic multiplier should be tied to political points or events in the game, not to a chronological timescale. Therefore, it would be failures and disasters that would trigger the move to a higher economic footing. Consequently, if the German army does too well, the multiplier drops or sticks. How this would be measured is an interesting debate.
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Problem is that if you do that sort of rule then people will start to game the system much like they game the limited war system now!

Charles Sutherland