[WarInEur] Pro-German bias

[srm]

changing the soviet stacking limit would kick some
serious ass!

FINALLY a good suggestion that overcomes the
ridiculous pro-german bias on the East Front!


--- Don Lazov <dlazov at comcast.net> wrote:

> My take on all this is a bit different.
>  
> The Germans invented the strurm (strosstruppen)
> groups during WW1 to break into the trench lines.
> They developed this with small detachments (which
> morphed in WW2 to kampfgruppen) at the tactical unit
> level. They then took the new ideas invented by the
> British and French of mechanized and air warfare to
> the next level. The Brits went one way (infantry
> support) and the French another (both infantry
> support and use as cavalry). The Germans then
> morphed the concepts learned from WW1 (those to
> break the trenches that they had developed and those
> that were used against them-tanks) and applied them
> in the Polish campaign and then the lessons drew
> from this they also applied in France 1940 and
> Russia 1941. 
>  
> Another thing the Germans did really well at the
> beginning of the war (1939-42) was to make decisions
> on the spot by the commander at the front and to
> send by word of mouth any changes. By 1943 Hitler
> had more and more of a micro command and a lot of
> leaders were attrition off in the 1941-42 battles in
> Russia and North Africa or were fired. By 1944 only
> Hitler had control of the strategic command
> structure (theater level) and independent thinking
> was punished by death or removal. Only Manstein kept
> his post and only till April 1944. October 1943 till
> the end of the war on the eastern front resulted in
> both army group commanders having no freedom of
> action or were directed by Hitler to either hold the
> line at all costs (and if they failed to obey they
> were either relieved of command or shot).
>  
> By 1943 the Soviets had learned from the Germans the
> art of war and in 1942 they tried to emulate the
> German operational ideas but failed miserably which
> led to the development of their own operational art
> of war that fit their own model and methodologies.
> This was attacking in echelon (very narrow fronts
> packed with Divisions, the correct stacking in
> 1943-45 for the Russians should be changed from 3
> Soviet units to 6 or more in a hex (pile on 6 x 5-5
> Guards Corps to crush the German line with support
> from 4-6 x 10-1-10 Art divisions).
>  
> The Germans developed and perfected the blitzkrieg
> model from 1939-42 from 1943 onwards they shifted
> more or less to the kampfgruppen idea in defense of
> France, Germany and their eastern frontiers. The
> Soviets developed and perfected the Echelon Attack
> (or attacking in depth) from 1943-45. The Allies
> mostly used a form of Blitzkrieg type of operational
> art but with a very heavy emphasis on the massive
> use Air Power.
>  
> In the original game from SPI this was modeled by
> the 4 CRT. Also, the original game War in the East
> the idea was for the Germans to attack the massive
> Russian lines at 2-1 to 4-1 odds with high
> casualties (flipping 6-5’s) in mind.
>  
> Any way I am rambling we all know this shit right?
> 
> --
> Don Lazov 
> ~Best Regards
> 
> -------------- Original message -------------- 
> From: sgminfo <sgminfo at aol.com> 
> 
> > Chuck Sutherland wrote: 
> > > Operational truth is operational truth, and
> blitzkrieg used combined arms and 
> > speed to win battles. This truth has not changed,
> the balance of power between 
> > weapon systems may have altered but the truth is
> the truth. And it was this 
> > truth that the allied took along time to grasp and
> counter. Had the Germans been 
> > able to supply their forces properly in Russia we
> would all have been speaking 
> > German. 
> > > 
> > > They were not lucky, they just did their
> homework and got it right as far as 
> > battle operations go. Fortunately for the world
> the allies had time and numbers 
> > and production on their side and those forces
> simply ground down the Axis. 
> > > 
> > > Considering the allies knew what the Germans
> were going to do makes the case 
> > for blitzkrieg even stronger. It would be like
> playing a basketball game and 
> > giving the other team your playbook and signals
> and seeing now long it takes for 
> > them to learn how to stop you. 
> > > 
> > > That operational prowess the German military
> used does not appear in the game 
> > system as it stands now because you can mount an
> effective delaying battle 
> > against the Germans. 
> > > 
> > > Early on that should not have been possible at
> least in the operational area 
> > of the Panzer Corps. 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > 
> > One extract I read from a British officer's
> musings brought the lesson 
> > home forcefully. 
> > 
> > His opinion, 
> > In a nutshell, 
> > 
> > 
> > The Germans were not particularly revolutionary, 
> > much of this had all been worked out by 1918, 
> > But they were very good at it. 
> > 
> > Lower formations had simple opening book
> approaches in standard 
> > predictable ways, 
> > the revolutionary aspect of this was that
> commanders in the Wehrmacht 
> > were rehearsed in this, 
> > and thus could place reliance on other units
> behaving in predictable ways, 
> > ways that could be hooked up to and allow larger, 
> > and more complex plans to take shape and be made
> manifest, 
> > The general allied reaction allowed far too much
> low level ad hoc 
> > battleplay, 
> > to the point that the multiplying complications 
> > outran the ability and the experience of the field
> officers to cordinate 
> > their units. 
> > 
> > i.e. experience and familiarity told heavily
> against us. 
> > 
> > Once we had learned the moves, 
> > their approach perversely played into our hands, 
> > as that very predictability enabled low level
> counter measures to 
> > operate with confidence and gusto. 
> > 
> > So, it then became a battle environment which our
> field commanders could 
> > follow and thereby operate in, without groping
> around in the dark. 
> > 
> > In 1940 many battles were not won by the Germans.
> they were lost by the 
> > allies, once things got a bit fluid and confusing,
> our commanders could 
> > not see the forest and the big picture, and once
> that sight had been 
> > lost the thread of the action went with it. 
> > 
> > In the Western Desert Ritchie and other British
> commanders fell into 
> > this trap. When Rommel was forced to retreat the
> first time, it was only 
> > the timely stepping in of the vastly more
> experienced theatre commander 
> > that prevented the Army commanders from
> acknowledging (erroneously) that 
> > they were beaten and withdrawing in confusion. 
> > 
> > Pondering this, you can then understand why the
> changing unit strength 
> > options is such a useful mod. Churchill was
> bedeviled by it, he saw the 
> > 8-10s lined up (he knew the ration and toe's). But
> unlike in the game, 
> > he could not see that his wonderfull 8-10 was in
> fact a 5-10, or 6-10 
> > instead. Many basic actions went awry because of
> such a simple, but 
> > devastating overvaluation of our actual
> capabilities of the time. 
> > 
> > Later in the War similar miscalculations as to
> capabilities and actual 
> > fighting performance led directly to many
> desasters in 1944-45 under 
> > Hitler's gaze. Mortain and Falaise were prime
> examples of this, a 
> > fundamental misappraisal of the physical and
> organisational capabilities 
> > of the German Army, when faced with an adverse
> balance of circumstance 
> > and forces., a misapprehension not shared by
> commanders 
=== message truncated ===>
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