[WarInEur] A thought on ports and things
sgminfo
sgminfo at aol.com
Wed Aug 20 06:01:30 EDT 2008
Kent & Sue Haunschild wrote:
> My problem with this idea is that if the Allies can land RR/MSU units
> at minor ports then the problems imposed by the "guaranteed" success
> of any Amph Assault are compounded. ITRW the German Fortifications
> were much more extensive and durable than allowed in the game.
I tend towards a differing conclusion....
Fortifications were extensive...in geographical terms..but the magnitude
of the effort required to cover the Atlantic coastline pretty much made
this a non starter in terms of density or quality.
The success of allied landings is not so much a function of their
amphibious capabilities, more a function of their ability to reinforce
once ashore, and out pace any response the indigenous forces could generate.
This partly flies against accepted wisdom...inthe game.
But, above a certain threshold,
the importance of landing craft was not in the assault, but more in the
ability to transport ashore large volumes of men and material in the
early stages of establishing a beachead that made a lasting bridgehead
possble.
The ugly truth, as Rommel realised...
That first 50meters of beach,
clear fields of fire,
with rifle companies struggling to reach the first ground into which
they could dig themselves...
was for him the key ground
At that point,
the accepted wisdom
was that the attacker was lightly armed,
lightly equipped
and had little staying power.
(hence the development og Hobart's devices)
That all changed within a couple of hours of the beach frontage being
secured,
as engineers began fabrication and assembly of equipment that could land
more efficiently,
and the arrival of stuff that was the heavy backbone of the infantry,
small numbers of tanks and artillery.
His problem was...
For the defender
How to get enough firepower on the beach to turn that 50meters into a
killing zone,
and quickly enough to catch the enemy in that vulnerable terrain.
Clearly an impossiblility, it had to be in situ to do that, which really
meant defending everything for the first couple of hours, and
effectively parcelling out too few units along too vast an extent of
defensive terrain
How strong the atlantic wall was, is a matter of some conjecture even
today...
In practice the Omaha debacle was not so much beach defences, but more
the presence of an unknown effective infantry division, able to man the
frontage effectively and turn that 50 meters into just that killing zone.
What really would be of great interest, would be to have a copy of
Rommel's reports on the condition and effectiveness of the Atlantik Wall
when he arrived, and its readiness on theeve of D-Day.
I am not sure that Rommel's opinions were that sanguine on its efficiency.
The other problem was a relatively simple one, but not so simple to solve.
Concrete....
How much was available,
the skilled personnel needed to pour it
availability of raw materials, transportation resources, and the large
amounts of unskilled labour for the basic handling.
It requires heavy equipment,
skilled carpenters (for the shuttering)
and lots of steel for re-bar work.
And the amount of re-bar work the Germs used was quite surprising.
As comments I have seen on the costruction ofthe Humbolt Str flak tower
in Berlin would seem to indicate.
Almost all of these resources must have been undergoing rationing,
considering the scale and magnatude of the undertaking.
Players can build the Atlanticwall was in terms of volume at a
staggering pace, well in excess og the ability of the construction
industry that German had available...
A more realistic addition to the game might be that choke point...
Perhaps in terms of the Atlantikwall type defences no more than 2 of
these counters per cycle.
It would be interesting to see the work done on establishing the
parameters and limits of construction ability that the Germans actually had.
The allied planners were watching carefully the rate of advance of
Rommel's work , and with more than just academic interest.
Another interesting pointer to the limitations of the defences,
was the shortages of decent modern ordnance the Germans were faced with,
Industry could not support the demands for coastal artillery, and much
was made up by pressing obsolescent captured equipment into the game...
It would be nteresting to find out,
thesiting of batteries,
howmuch was owed to the defesive requirements,
and how much to the exigencies of what the available artillery could do.
When you consider theamount of destruction being visited upon the
transport network,
German construction schedules must have been under some serious pressure.
Indeed, as a follow on, many defensive batteries were rationing rounds
early on in an attempt to retain their deterrent power during the
landings whilst desperately awaiting resupply of dwindling stocks of
ready use ammunition...
-|steve|-
-|steve|=
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