[WarInEur] A thought on ports and things

sgminfo sgminfo at aol.com
Mon Aug 18 10:33:11 EDT 2008


While your analysis is correct and I personally would like to "fix" many 
of the map errors, to some extent we are dealing with the "Law of 
Unintended Consequences." Or, some of the rules effects require that we 
adjust our perception of reality.
>  
> Ports are a good example.  Their status (major or minor) or even 
> omission or inclusion on the map has to be seen through the eyes of 
> the historical simulation designer.
>  
> For example- If you look at the game rules covering Amph assaults and 
> compare them to the real risks you will find that the defender retreat 
> result is not really justified.  However, if you consider the fact 
> that the Allies never had a failure then the rule is perfectly 
> satisfactory.
>  
> But, then you get into the "unintended consequences."  If the Allied 
> invasion can't fail, then the quickest way to Germany is straight back 
> through Belgium and Holland.  But that didn't happen either.
>  
> SPI's solution was to jigger the port status and rail net work so that 
> only the major ports in north western France will be usable by the 
> Allies this guiding game play in the historic direction.
>  
> My personal objection in this area has to do with the Allied Sealift 
> capability.  Never in their wildest wet dreams could the Allies dredge 
> up enough sealift for 15 divisions, much less Amph capability for 15 
> more.  Especially at the same time.  It's way to much of a good thing.

The addendum to that with the problems engendered by skewing ports etc 
is very much this example of unintended consequences...

In the Game it is pretty clear, to the German commanders, where and when 
(amphib assault). So you garrison the major ports and fight like hell 
and defend them to the death.
Other areas of fortress Europe go hang,
and makedo with garrison troops of the allies...

ITRW
Things were never so cosy and tidy.

1.Allied interntions were well concealed.
2.German estimations of Allied capability were seriously deficient.
   a)Theydid not fully understand what was required for the sealift to 
beaches.
   b) had not kept track of growing allied capabilities.

These were manifest in Hitler's preoccupation with Norway, and the 
potential threat to it.
The overwhelming desire to see the Pas de Calais as a certain route


Result in game terms. The German defense tended to be formulaic and to a 
serious degree lost focus.

He who would defend evrything defends nothing etc etc...

Developing the assault rules required much head scratching and 
simplification...

For example,
Its not the landings that were the key point for the Allies,
but the days following...
How fast they could project power ashore,
and gather forces to break out of any lodgement area,
which in itself seriously limited the possible options that could be 
used to advantage after hitting the beaches...hence the channel coast 
and normandy,
or the Pas de Calais.

The limited distances to travel for resupply,
availability of full air cover,
andport handling capacity
coupled with the distance from Germany,
made Normandy (but only in retrospect) the obvious choice.


Most of the considerations that would force you along the historical 
route are not simulated...
Hence the Major port/ minor port business.

But the positioning of that, in turn, cuts out Norway as a credible 
objective, which in turn saves the German commander 20 divisions wasted 
there itrw.

The juxtaposition of the various compromises mean that whilst amphibious 
warfare works, it doesn't work in quite the way that posed such 
conundrums for the Germans...
and at the same time, such devices as 'Mulberry' do not act to 
completely throw the theoretical basis of defense upon which the 
defender was banking.
We don't have 'mulberry' so the simulation breaks down a bit in that regard.

Usually its not a key regard, as capturing cherbourg so soon after 
getting ashore usually solves that problem. ITRW mulberry turned out 
tobe vital, and the effect of denial of this device, (the consequences 
of the 'Great Storm' in July) can clearly be seen in restrictions 
applied to allied operations for some small time, whilst the resulting 
snafu with logistics was sorted out.


In CWIE 1 I developed a hybrid unit that enabled us to geta rail unit or 
MSU ashore via a minor port, and this did much to muddy the waters as 
far as the German defender was concerned, the defensive task suddenly 
increased initially, and could now include Norwegian ports, but then was 
back to the problem of how to get more stuff to the allied beachead to 
seal it off before the alliesgot a stranglehold ashore...



-|steve|-
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://mailman.halisp.net/pipermail/warineur/attachments/20080818/b9ba8254/attachment-0001.html


More information about the WarInEur mailing list