[WarInEur] Supply by Air

[sgminfo]

Your points are well taken, and I note, well made, and to a certain 
degree Iaccept.
However,
The amphib beachead supply is my estimation of what is more normally 
catered for, and is not unresaonable, the 'minor supply' is an 
abstraction, but not invalid. It does not imply  that all forces are 
'actually' in supply permanently, but that supply is called down and 
concentrated where the tonnage is most needed. So the air supply might 
be called in directly for 5th division under heavy pressure, or 21st 
Panzer stalled for fuel outside Sollum.

But the bookeeping involved puts this out of the ball park, since air 
supply is so flexible and can support relatively rapidly any individual 
units, the effect is one of seeming to supply all. An abstraction that 
can be lived with. Meanwhile ATPs being attrited say at 3 per turn, out 
of 15 means such an extravagent use will not be maintainable, thus the 
norm will be only beachead supply. The cost in terms of the ATP fleet 
will be unsustainable and a heavy drain of production points.
In addition the lead time on replacement ATPs will make maintaining such 
a pool beyond normal situations.

As regards the 'built in' factor, yes, I am inclined to agree, yet the 
abstraction itself is uncomfortable in that regard, for example, if 
true, then there ought to be a  reduction in supply range when one loses 
air supremacy and are driven from the skies, most noticably when 
thingsgo wrong in France n 1940, orRussia after1942, or Tunisia in 1943 
but does not, in fact, get modelled.

In the East, and in Tunisia, the air resupply dimension was not just a 
gloss on the game, it was fundamental to the derailing of German 
strategy, and was at the core of desasters such as Stalingrad. and 
Tunisia. The Germans would not have squandered so wantonly, their aerial 
resources, without a very real appreciation of the value of such efforts 
in the frontline.

in the west we tend to underestimate the value of such efforts as they 
were normally subsumed in the general efforts, and in the general scheme 
of things, did not amount to a huge hill of beans. Yet 14th Army in 
Burma, despite constant shortages of air asets. proved them to be 
essential in the maintenance of their defense, and the defeat of the 
Japanese, rendering conventional wisdom (ie WIE style) supply invalid, 
and drawing the Japanese to their doom based on their certain knowledge, 
that cutting the ground links would destroy the resource hungry allied 
units, from mounting any effective defense.

-|steve|-

Karl Gaarsoe wrote:
> Actually, a lot of the "Airlift" resupply you are discussing is 
> already built into BWiE with the generous supply ranges. 
>
> IIRC, historically, most of of the Day-to-Day Luftwaffe effort went to 
> support ongoing Luftwaffe efforts, lifting parts, ordanance and even 
> gas to Forward operating bases. 
>
> Same with the Allies, Patton may have received some airlifted fuel, 
> but this was (is) covered by the standard 10 MP supply chain.
>
> But supporting an OOS airhead?  Certainly NOT to the extent of 
> supporting Minor Supply. 
>
> Let's keep the focus of the game on broad Strategy, with a fine 
> grained operational combat resolution.  Any fiddling with this kind of 
> rule just opens the door to abuse by clever rules lawyers.
>
> Karl Gaarsoe
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
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