[WarInEur] Re: The concept of aerial re-supply
sgminfo
sgminfo at aol.com
Mon Oct 15 12:31:17 EDT 2007
Well, like myself originally, I submit, you are seriously
underestimating the ability to lift goods, services, and manpower.
The only airlift normally quoted is Stalingrad...and the inadequacies of
this operation..promising the impossible etc etc. Indeed most of the
reasons that the airlift capability was fatally overestimated was due
to special factors.
1.The impossible flying conditions
2.The lack of good all weather airfields, and the immediate loss of
the best forward air supply heads.and fields.
3.The steadily widening gulf between beseiged and supply bases
4.The fact that the Luftwaffe was already just committing itself to
tfour huge efforts in the Mediteranean.
a) The build up f the Tunisian bridgehead, more men and
equipment were being poured in by air than by sea.
b)DAK was being supplied operationally to save it as it
retreated through from Alamein.
c)The bomber force was committed to round the clock maximum
efforts attempting to disrupt the western med ports being used for Torch
d)The specialist anti shipping units were already being
overcommitted at the North Cape, and were needing to be withdrawn to
deal with Torch.
Gven any one of these crises, the tonnages lifted could have made the
balance, but the combination of bad timing, poor staff work, ( promising
the Luftwaffe knew no bounds), when it was already trading off its
training school assets (raided for Torch, and stripped bare for Stalingrad)
Indeed, the power to do useful resupply work was certainly sufficient in
good weather to supply 6th Army, or The Tunisian bridgehead, but not
both, add the complication of Torch, and the Luftwaffe was shattered by
the load, which actually represents the resilience and capacity in a
wholly unfavourable, and misleading light.
Note thesuggestion that 15AP are required for minor supply into the
supply head, is not that excessive when taking the average airpoint at
Geschwader strength requires a commitment to airborn lift of some 1350
aircraft, a by no means trivial allotment.
With that volume of air assets committed, beachead supply is a lot more
restrictive than we are should be crediting, given the fact that this is
to an army within 4 hexes of the supply head. And bearing inmind that
the Axis force structures generallyrequired substantially less resources
to maintainbasic fighting trim, than theirallied equivalents.
The Tunisian bridgehead certainly contained more forces than
weremaintainable by beachead supply and over larger distances, and
allowing for a greater than 50% contribution made by the real transport
crews.
The rules on supply to ports in adverse air control aireas heavily mask
this vital component and the part it played.
Hence my suggestion that if youcommitted 5 APs, you got beachead supply,
but if 15 were committed you could get minor supply.
Notethat the 15 ATPs at normal wastage rates would prove to be very to
sustain, over any length of time, but could be achieved for short
duration surge efforts.
Also, in terms of game mechanics...
Use 5ATPs on thesouthern front, switches on beachead supply for one
airhead, any airhead, anywhere on the Southern Front. I.E. You have the
ability to place one marker. 15 allows 3 beachead supply airheads
anywhere, or one minor supply airhead.
These could be colour coded as to value, and when the minimum ATPs are
no longerthere to support that front, ALL airhead supply is out of
action until thephasing player disbands sufficient airheads to satisy
the minimum reqirements of enabling ATPs.
A simple player-powered bookeeping exercise, or the max demands exceed
committed ATPs and supply gets switched off. which is not too onererous
for the computer to track...
-|steve|-
dsl wrote:
> I like the concept, but I would suggest simplifying it. The "air head"
> supply would function like an AMPH beachhead supply. Very limited range (not
> many trucks or gas is going to be supplied by air) and somewhat limited
> capabilities (no air zones traced from it). You spend one ATP per turn to
> supply with attrition and cycling like that of an air drop or glider
> operation.
>
> This would be reusing existing code (or code that should exist) for the most
> part. While it might allow for a limited support of the hex, it isn't going
> to support a large pocket, and the cost to maintain is going to be large. It
> would allow for a Stalingrad pocket to survive a bit longer than otherwise,
> but at a pretty horrible cost of ATP and thus production points.
>
> As always with these sorts of changes, it would be an option so people who
> don't want to "taint" the CWIE don't have to.
>
> -John
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> WarInEur mailing list
> WarInEur at mailman.halisp.net
> http://mailman.halisp.net/mailman/listinfo/warineur
>
More information about the WarInEur
mailing list