[WarInEur] unit values and levels of combat.

[Wardall Clark]

Chuck and I have been corresponding off list on the matter of whether the Axis advantage in 
combined arms doctrine is properly reflected in the Combat system. At issue is whether the France 1940 debacle can be captured in WIE as the rules stand. Any one 
reading the last week's post knows upon which side each of use come downs. I think certain 
problems in the WIE campaign game are mostly fixed by the switch to FOW and Attrition. For BWIE,
the best fix is either enforcement of the Historical First move rules or some missing incentive that 
obliges the Allies to make a good faith effort to defend Belgium or else face a diplomatic disaster. 
Chuck thinks the problem lies in the rule prohibiting any combat other than the 13-1 overruns during 
movement. 
Here is what we agree upon;   (1) the German units in real life were so much better than the opposing 
Allied units that there really wasn't any way that even a panzer-schooled set of Allied army commanders
was not going to save France in 1940. (2) The Axis divisions in WIE are sufficiently better than the Allied 
ones that sooner or later Vichy is going to be declared unless the Non-cooperation rule is drastically 
relaxed and the Brits commit a massive BEF to the continent. 
 
Where we came to verbal blows was over the meaning in Game terms of the Germans combined arms doctrine 
My posts got more and more know it all, his got increasingly cryptic and defensive.  Recently, he 
wrote me: 
 
> I am coming at it from an operational stand point and I guess you from a > tactical standpoint. Tactically the allies stood in places and gave a > good account, but operationally they were a day late and a dollar short, > thats were I am coming from, and I don't think unit values can give a > good account of the operational differences of the two sides in 1940 > without a mobile attack feature to break up the defensive lines.> > I think we both want the same thing, historical feel to the old girl. I > love this system and have tinkered with different ideas for about 20 > years now and finally hit on a PGG type fix. I'll keep play testing it > till I can get a full view of things from end to end.> 
RW Military officers have a useful slogan, "Amateurs study Operations;
professional learn Logistics." The missing part of this is that first 
the professional officer learns tactics: which is the art of maneuvering 
in the presence of enemy forces.   One of the secrets of the "us military'scurrent dominance is its school for battalions at the california training 
center.  There the ultra-experienced OPFOR resident brigade uses Soviet
block tactics/equipment to polished perfection for two weeks of on the 
job training for the visiting team/  
 
Every war game has its own tactics, but these are essentially means 
for maximizing results given the constraints of the rules of that
particular game. What the soldiers and officers at the battle school 
teach has literally nothing to do with these sorts of tactics.  
 
So what is the connection: It comes when we try to make counters for units with different training 
or equipment.  The superior tactical skills of German small units such as companies and battalions 
is multiplied by the number of such units in a brigade or division and it translates as an Operational edge in the form of bigger faster units to deploy in WIE.   German division commanders likewise made better use 
of their assets than the Allies did even though the men and equipment were of roughly equal quality. 
Both Chuck and I agree that this operational edge is so big as to be decisive in France-40 WIE play. 
We disagree as to whether it is sufficiently large to emulate historical events.  Deploy those RW units as they were deployed historically and the Van Manstein plan provides a whopping strategic advantage, I.E. THE ALLIES ARE DEPLOYED IN THE WRONG PLACES and the process of first racing one direction and then racing southward and doing it through air interdicted hexes deprives the BEF of its full (and already optional rule reduced) combat effectiveness.   Once the Axis cuts off the Brits from their Major ports those too far from the minor ports is halved and so can be chewed up by the pursuing axis infantry. WAR in Europe is an operational level game in that the details of actual combat is lost. Hexes have terrain types, but except for rivers there are are no preferred directions of advance through the hexes. What we call tactics in WIE is actually what a Current USA Army level commander calls operations. The Army commander determines which units are assigned to the corps(stack) and where the stack goes to fight and if the Army commander knows his stuff then these directions facilitate the Armys assigned missions. (i.e the Army's place in the Strategy that was developed by the Front Commander such as IKe and Swartzkoft.)  WIE is unique in that by encompassing all the action of the Eurpean theatres, players are charged with functions of Grand Stategy (ala AH's Third Reich) but also with the operational details of emplimenting the strategy(B-17, Anzio, D-DAY, Africa Korps, Kursk, etc.)   Nowhere in the game does anything resembling RW tactics occur, hence the discussion of Combined Arms Doctrine is misguided, except when arguing about whether the units have the right combat capabilities. 
 
In this last area, Chuck is talking sense; he feels that the RW units of WWII, especially the 400 tank Armored
divisions of 1940 were capable of fighting and winning battle after battle within a matter of days just as 
the US V corps and British First Armored Armored division did in the Gulf war. By and large he is right, but 
perhaps not in the terms of WIE. The real battle field had support units and units too small to be combat
units in a division level game all over the place as the front disintegrated.  ITRW there are no empty hexes. 
 
My guess is that any account of a 100 mile fighting advance is actually talking about the practice of 
dispersing and or bypassing these unit fragments., which are too small to generate advance restricting ZOC
for the hexes they occupy. In order to generate a ZOC in its own hex a unit  must be4 able to effectively 
impede movement across a 20 mile front. Most units smaller than a brigade cannot do this, hence each 
Corps and Army's support units have either been incorporated into the strengths of the divisions and brigades
or are listed as abstractions such as Replacement points, and supply ranges. 
 
BOB
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