[WarInEur] Re: WarInEur Digest, Vol 40, Issue 32

[Lawrence Duffield]

The French proved that they could indeed stop the Panzers on  
occasion, and that they could even successfully counterattack.  Their  
failure was not the troops or equipment, but the commanders,  
exaggerated by a strategic blunder of the first order.  It is in the  
mobile battle, when the Germans could create one, that their faults  
magnified.

While we're looking at adding realism, that needs to be noted as  
well.  The average French infantry division was quite capable  
defending against the average German infantry division.  WIE models  
this fairly well with its entrenched side (then takes away the  
insight by not allowing entrenchment until several months after  
combat begins).

On Nov 16, 2007, at 9:00 AM, warineur-request at mailman.halisp.net wrote:

>
> The high command had it been trained by the germans still could not  
> have
> stopped the panzers because the doctrine was wrong!
>

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