[WarInEur] greatest general in corporals boots

Thu Nov 15 14:13:14 EST 2007

Van Manstein's assessment of Hitler was roughly as follows;

1) He understood machinery and tactics at least as well as his field marshals
2) He had at least as good a geopolitical understanding as his field marshals 
(but tended to skimp on advance consideration of the possible outcomes of
major military operations and thus missed the chance to invade England 
during or immediately after the victory over France.) 
3) He could be brought to see military possibilities for offense well enough 
to recognize the difference between a sure thing and a risky operation, 
(at least prior to 1944.)

Common weaknesses 
1) Tendency to overestimate the effectiveness of technology. 
2) Inability to recognize that economic objectives had direct value to Germany
only if there was little long term risk of being recaptured by the enemy. 3) Unwillingness to reconsider assessments of the balance of forces. 

  YET the BIG missing item was "military ability based on experience"  
By which Van Manstein meant that Hitler was too inexperienced to foresee how certain 
situations could be resolved for the better or at least salvaged if the officers 
in command had a free hand to shift forces.   Even worse, he 
would constantly fail to recognize the need to concentrate forces at the 
active areas when his own forces were under attack. 

This llast is a function that only an overall front commander could perform, and Hitler 
considered any overall commander for the EAST to be a threat to his power.  Hence 
from 1942-1945 the overall commander was a man with insufficient military experience 
for the position.  Ike, while not the best possible ground commander the Allies had, 
was nevertheless up to the job when critical moments arose in June and Dec 1944.  

Hitler was paradoxically recklessly aggressive Diplomatically and overly conservativein militarily matters.  Being unable to accurately assess military risks, he lost faith 
in his military commanders just when he most needed to listen to them.  This led 
many of them to regard him as dangerous to the future of Germany, and Hitler 
picked up this and became ever more paranoid. 

Oddly enough, the men he would have been able to trust whole heartedly were the ones
like Van Manstein who were devoted to their troops and to the military arts.  When asked why 
he never participated or supported efforts to undermine Hitler, he replied that during the period 
that he controlled resources the outcome in the East was in doubt.  The one certain result if he 
or any other senior Army commander openly used their positions in this way would have been 
military defeat due to a collapse of military cohesion . And such a result simply wasn't acceptable 
to a man of Van Manstein's upbringing and training. 
BOB

> Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2007 11:30:14 -0500> From: warineur-request at mailman.halisp.net> Subject: WarInEur Digest, Vol 40, Issue 30> To: warineur at mailman.halisp.net> > Send WarInEur mailing list submissions to> warineur at mailman.halisp.net> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit> http://mailman.halisp.net/mailman/listinfo/warineur> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to> warineur-request at mailman.halisp.net> > You can reach the person managing the list at> warineur-owner at mailman.halisp.net> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific> than "Re: Contents of WarInEur digest..."> > > Today's Topics:> > 1. Re: RE: breaking through to Minsk (sgminfo)> 2. RE: WarInEur Digest, Vol 40, Issue 29 (Wardall Clark)> > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------> > Message: 1> Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2007 15:46:10 +0000> From: sgminfo <sgminfo at aol.com>> Subject: Re: [WarInEur] RE: breaking through to Minsk> To: Wardall Clark <baseballnut570 at hotmail.com>> Cc: war in europe forum <warineur at mailman.halisp.net>> Message-ID: <473C69C2.7080902 at aol.com>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed> > I am not saying that attack on the march is right or that it is wrong,> but the process that gives rise to it,> may be based upon a faulty assumption.> > Attack on the march may dress the armies with characteristics that, > surprisingly, they did not actually possess, rather, their commanders > did, and this is what the games are all about, the whoile ' > not_acting_as_General_Muggins', but seeing if we can do better that > Gamelin, Scipio, Alexander .> > When we visit 1944,> the German armies were hamstrung by interferance from the Greatest > General ever to fill a Corporal's boots,> This is not a criticism, for an untutored mind, this character had a > most remarkable grasp of military matters, rather an accurate summation > of his strengths and (inevitable) weaknesses> > this half led them up the France 40 route and deliveredthem to the > allies at Falaise,> but could you see Von Runstedt or Rommel allowing that to happen???> > DAGC is a classic case, it rests entirely on one man's appreciation, > against the best professional advice available that it was 'all one > gigantic bluff'. But we do not drill the Germans in and bolt them in > place for the desaster to unfurl.> > To a significant degree our problems (perceived) are entirely of our own > making...some asymetry may be needed to solve the 'issue' that we > ourselves create.> > > -|steve|-> > > ------------------------------> > Message: 2> Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2007 11:29:35 -0500> From: Wardall Clark <baseballnut570 at hotmail.com>> Subject: [WarInEur] RE: WarInEur Digest, Vol 40, Issue 29> To: <warineur at mailman.halisp.net>> Message-ID: <BAY126-W388C0A4E13C08B4BDF1B0D84820 at phx.gbl>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"> > Steve's post reiterates a very important point about military deployments,while commanders are > supposed to think in terms of worse case scenarios, the most sucessful battles come either when > one side secretly divines the other sides intentions, or the other side makes a false assumption that> what is impossible for it is also impossible for the opposing side. > ======================================================================> I am reminded of a difference in armored philosophies that was resolved in in 1940-41. > The allies and Soviets had more tanks, but they were dispersed amidst non-motorized infantry companies.> A brigade or division with such a TOE can defend itself fairly well when terrain permits, but without fully > mechanized battalions it lacks mobility to fight a war of maneuver. > =============================================================================> The hexes in WIE are so big that we tend to think of maneuver in terms of breakouts, retreats and> and movement to combat. However, what is normally involved in mechanized modern combat is the > shifting of battalions within the battle area. One reason the Axis units have such high combat ratings is > to reflect the skills of the unit commanders and sub-unit commanders at this form of "mobile warfare"> ==============================================================================> However, once all the battalions of a unit are fully mechanized, new operational level possibilities emerge. > Brigade sized units can pass through the gaps between enemy formations into rear areas. Furthermore, > If enough such brigades are bunched together, they can completely overrun a front line position creating > a hole through which other brigades or even whole divisions may pass. > ==============================================================================Steve's point is this, if an Avalon Hill player (locking Zones of Control, forced combat and movement a> after combat only for victorious units) was in charge of France and Belgium in his first WIE game, > then his units will quite probably move and stack in ways that invite deep armored penetrations. What looks > like a quite adequate defense (i.e. units stacked in mutual support) is actually something of a sieve against > a mainly mechanized attacking force. I know, because I made this mistake many times when I first switched> game systems. What looked smart given my experience with AH's Anzio turned out to be disastrous. > ===================================================================================> The Allied commanders in 1940 were in a doubly vulnerable position: They didn't know what the terrain > costs were for mechanized travel through the Ardennes. They assumed that armored formations would get > bogged down there and hence Luxemburg was not a problem area. > ==================================================================================> General Swartzkoff temporarily made a similar error in 1990. He assumed that the sand of the desert to the > west of Kuwait was too soft for M-1 Abrams tanks and hence it would be a trap for his heaviest divisions. > When asked to submit an offensive plan, he laid out one in which his forces studiously avoided that area. > =================================================================================> Later, having been promised sufficient forces that a flanking attack was militarily sound, Centcom sent out > scouts to take sod samples and discovered the assumption to be wrong. Swartzkoff then realized that > as he had no units out that way, the Iraqi Command might be assuming that that west of Kuwait was a> safe zone for them. According, he waited until the Iraqis had no aerial reconnaissance and then secretly > repositioned two corps to his extreme left. The Republican Guard was thus attacked from an unexpected > direction and was routed with minimal Centcom casualties. > ====================================================================> BOB> > > > > Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2007 10:19:09 -0500> From: warineur-request at mailman.halisp.net> Subject: WarInEur Digest, Vol 40, Issue 29> To: warineur at mailman.halisp.net> > Send WarInEur mailing list submissions to> warineur at mailman.halisp.net> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit> http://mailman.halisp.net/mailman/listinfo/warineur> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to> warineur-request at mailman.halisp.net> > You can reach the person managing the list at> warineur-owner at mailman.halisp.net> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific> than "Re: Contents of WarInEur digest..."> > > Today's Topics:> > 1. Re: War in the East 2nd Edition Page 4... (Don Lazov)> 2. RE: breaking through to Minsk (Wardall Clark)> 3. Re: RE: breaking through to Minsk (sgminfo)> > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------> > Message: 1> Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2007 17:42:08 +0000> From: dlazov at comcast.net (Don Lazov)> Subject: Re: [WarInEur] War in the East 2nd Edition Page 4...> To: "Dickson, Kevin P (Kevin)" <kevin.dickson at verizonbusiness.com>,> WarinEur at mailman.halisp.net> Message-ID:> <111420071742.3791.473B3370000328CC00000ECF22165279669001960E040B at comcast.net>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"> > Skipped content of type multipart/alternative-------------- next part --------------> An embedded message was scrubbed...> From: "Dickson, Kevin P (Kevin)" <kevin.dickson at verizonbusiness.com>> Subject: [WarInEur] War in the East 2nd Edition Page 4...> Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2007 15:07:35 +0000> Size: 699> Url: http://mailman.halisp.net/pipermail/warineur/attachments/20071114/a547398b/attachment-0001.mht> > ------------------------------ Chuck seems to feel that if something occurred once in WWII, then the rules ought not to make it impossible. On the surface, this seems a reasonable position. The problem is that a war game may not be able to model some of the RW factors that made the event possible. The classic example of this is the Arde!> nnes bre> akthrough, with Blitzkrieg ZOC and some overruns at least one mech unit should be able to advance a total of 8 hexes in a single week. However as this may involve weaving between allied stacks so that the distance as the crow flies is somewhat less than 160 miles. The gimmick to this example is that the allies are not deployed in solid lines of units. How could such a set up occur? Well, in WIE with an experienced allied player, it simply won't. The experiencedAllied player knows that ultimately the Axis can't be stopped, so any defense is really just a play for time. Any French or Belgium units will ultimately be lost to his cause so the best way to use them is to trade them for time rather than try to bunch up and stop the Panzers in their tracks. > > The situation in Russia is ultimately the same. Set up in one way and the Soviets lose Minsk on turn one. Setup another way and the Axis is lucky to end turn one 3 hexes past the 1941 start line. I do not know what isthe basis for the computer set ups in CWIE but I doubt it come from the Historical files of the red Army. If the Soviets employ a radically A-historical set up, then the first turn will transpire rather differently than the corresponding first week from WWII. > > > Subject: Re: [WarInEur] RE: breaking through to Minsk> > To follow on to Bob's points....> > If you wish to test how 'historical' the game flows> The the 1940 scenario is the one to test, not the campaign game.> > Does the capaign game follow history?> No...> > The French high command are a bunch of ex panzer pushers and thus have > an all too real appreciation of the Panzers prowess and capabilities. So > the French are always commanded by a well rersearched student of > military history, not the guys whose misfortune it was to face the > panzers before the book of ww2 had been opened and the plot determined.> > ..Now if you put a newbie in charge of the french, the you might get > historical results...> > It was not that the french were not capable of a much more effective > defence, it was that they simply...> > a)Did not understand the nature of the beast and had no chance to learn...> b)When they did see it happening, not only did they not understand the > significance of the German moves, but actively cooperated with the > German masterplan.> > How many consuls of the Republic, at thegates of Cannae, would so > fulsomely cooperate to produce a repeat of the desaster that befell them > at the hands of Hannibal.> > Alternatively, how many commanders would put the Pacific fleet at a > peacetime footing, in the anchorage of Pearl Harbour on December 7th?> > Or would you be dining out in the bars and restaurants of Taranto, with > your entire fleet laid out in the _completely secure_ anchorage , > blythely unaware of the arrival of sSwordfish in the evening gloom?> > Now there is nothing to stop us engineering a repeat performance...but > we have to be as innocent lambs to the slaughter..> > If the Game starts in May 1940, again OK, but if the game starts in > September 1939, are you going to freeze deployments for any active > belligerents? You see the lessons ofPoland, only because you know what > they are...now...in 1939 it was a very different picture, just as the > Gulf showed a plethora of mista!> ken appr> eciations and assumptions, > fortunately in our favour.> > Not to get Russia to work, that is EXACTLY what the rules do, forcing > the Soviets to stay forward, and a mass of bolt on rules to try and > force them into histoical behaviour. A prudent commander, would deploy, > in the light of his knowledge,. in an entirely different way...> > ...we do in France, and see nothing wrong, yet seem to blindly accept > the opposite in Russia in 1941...> An apparent contradiction,,,> > -|steve|-> _________________________________________________________________> Windows Live Hotmail and Microsoft Office Outlook – together at last.  Get it now.> http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/outlook/HA102225181033.aspx?pid=CL100626971033> -------------- next part --------------> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...> URL: http://mailman.halisp.net/pipermail/warineur/attachments/20071115/e26a1a95/attachment.html> > ------------------------------> > _______________________________________________> WarInEur mailing list> WarInEur at mailman.halisp.net> http://mailman.halisp.net/mailman/listinfo/warineur> > > End of WarInEur Digest, Vol 40, Issue 30> ****************************************
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