[WarInEur] World War II Game

[sgminfo]

Daniel Jagelman wrote:
> Fair enough. Perhaps I could ask if there is a direct relationship between supply and the ability to force rivers. Where the front line was in 'major' supply, perhaps you are correct in that rivers did not present major obstacles. The availability of engineers to construct bridges, hard or soft, under fire or otherwise was a huge asset.
>
> What about where the front line is in minor supply? No engineers? If the reconn units could not seize the bridge and it is blown, then what option is there to cross the river? Pontoons and barges?
>
> Given that most attacks will be in major supply anyway although I like the distinct in theory, in fact it would make little impact in the game. Maybe there is nothing in this. It just bugs me that for any commander, crossing major rivers were major consideration and seizing bridges intact fundamental to going forward swiftly, so much is abstracted out of a game of CWIE's scale that the strategic importance of most real world landmarks (bridges, railways, ports) is absent and I think this is shame.
>   
Good point.As far as I can see, the real issue as you describe is 
muddied up and obscured by the fact that in most campaigns in WW2 rarely 
did the defender avail himself of a river defence, unless he had been 
soundly beaten,  strategic commanders were seduced with the thought of 
trying the issue first with their intact formations, and only seeking 
cover as a last resort.  After Kursk, Normandy, and Ardenne, 
circumstance forced the cammanders hand, whereas hindsight revealed that 
the course of action chosen was always less than optimal. Almost as a 
contradiction in terms, the Dnepr, Seine, Rhine, and Vistula , all 
became major defensive works when the defender was in such condition as 
to have compromised (usually fatally) his ability eith to man the river 
line, or provide adequate forces to deal effectively with any attempt to 
bounce the barrier.

Thus, ITRW, as far as I know, the issue was never properly tested, there 
being a dearth of "prudent", "rational" behaviour.

Perhaps the best examples of the minor supply situation might be XXX 
corps on the road to Arnhem,  and Patton with the Remargen bridge, but 
in both situations the issue was distorted by the serious problems that 
the defender found himself with, making a balanced assessment very 
difficult to encompass.

The loss of the Dnepr line  showed that the soviets could bounce a river 
with ease, but against that, it must be allowed, that the Gerrmans were 
in extremis, and particularly hard put to creating a defensive position 
to enable any sort of effective opposition.

However, one must allow that the German forcing of the meuse in 1940, 
was done with minimal equipment (if compared with later allied efforts), 
and was made against a foe with  sufficient men and equipment,

A river valley (as may be often the case), tends to work both ways, 
leaving the defender sometimes exposed on the forward slope if they wish 
to cover the waters edge.

 



-|steve|-