[WarInEur] Comment on Attrition
sgminfo
sgminfo at aol.com
Sun Jul 29 15:42:37 EDT 2007
Kent's points are well made on the whole concept.
The interesting thing about this is, on the theoretical side we can make
good arguments either way, indeed most points are sufficiently plausible
to half convince us before we get to the table.
Where things fall off the rails, intriguingly, are that the actual
experience of a game in anger against a live and unpredictable opponent,
often seem not to agree with our expectations. There are enough
variables interacting to make the effect sufficiently complex to just
about make our projections suddenly seem, disconcertingly, so much less
predictable.
For example, often overlooked:-
The Soviet player makes a break and runs for it, secure in the knowldge
that when he fetches up at the outskirts of Moscow, his opponent will be
at 60-95% attrition, and like lambs to the slaughter.
The experience of the reality:-
He suddenly himself finds his own formations struggling there, are every
bit as bad, and the theoretical seesaw is not quite so one sided as
first calculations do appear. The defender might run, but use the
railways or he might go by sea, or he just might walk. The possibilities
are quite significant, but the effects of the mix are anything but obvious.
At this moment almost everyone is convinced that the Germans will suffer
a veritable massacre in front of Moscow.
NO ONE HAS REALLY GAMED IT OUT yet. The reality may be completely
different, indeed it may take several games before the Germans evolve a
tactical course that allows them to survive, or again, this task may
have to be done by the Soviets. What we fail to appreciate is that the
flood of new forces fleshing out the line for the Soviets may not even
be fit enough, initially, to take on a rampaging MSU.
The key fact is...once again...like 1941..none of us yet really are sure
of the outcome, the maths leads us to but one conclusion, but in
1941..there was in the real world but one general conclusion..and there
everyone was mistaken.
. So what the concept does, it turns over the gaming tables a little
bit, and we are faced with new unknowns, clouding the stereotyped and
overplanned games such that the issue is once more less than perfectly
forseeable.
To underscore that point, the tables are not fixed in stone, but can be
tweaked, as the experience builds up, so we can mod the effect towards
the mean, if there are ahistorical outcomes that we are pretty certain
are due to distortions.
But consider this, it may be possible to remove the special layer of
kludge factors that we have for the first winter, with attrition in
action, and have, for the first time, universal supply rules that don't
have to be bent, as they are in the standard game , to ensure that the
Soviets stand a chance of surviving that first year in the field.
It is a possible (no more) route to enjoying the game in a new way, as
an experience that feels very different, and very much less plannable
with most of the field commanders here, who have a most well appointed
book of opening moves. Since most of the effects are relatively small
scale and fixed (movement at the moment causing a 4% change in strength,
for example), they are not so unstable and capricious, as to turn a
battle into a multi-layered lottery.
But what we can say...
The option is just that...
It is also tunable
And it is new
So the risks of inserting new wine into old bottles, are heavily set
about with hedges, and tweaks, to minimise the damage, or amplify it, as
we find out a bit more in the tasting.
-|steve|-
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