[WarInEur] Attrition a New Look
SGMINFO at aol.com
SGMINFO at aol.com
Sun Jul 22 05:36:01 EDT 2007
In a message dated 22/07/2007 10:01:20 GMT Daylight Time, foufut at yahoo.com
writes:
a very unconvincing sell.
"Axis units at 40-50% strength? Big deal. looks like
the Allies were in the same boat, but no metion of
that.
Actually, you are correct on that point, but that is in stark contrast to
the general criticism of the concepts behind this option. Most theorising on
this point has repeatedly underscored the central idea that this option
crucially weakened the offensive, and makes France 1940 an unreplicatable shambles
with a weakened German offensive petering out inevitably short of Paris, in
utter exhaustion, piles of 10-8s at 90% attrition heaped there useless, to the
Agressive Panzer player.
The interplay of forces would appear to be a deal more complex in
experience, and not necesssarily solely to the defenders advantage.
When a full scale OST front opens, the prospects are anything but obvious.
In terms of historicity, the operational strengths of the Panzer force seem
to approximate with figures found in the French Campaign.
For the British, the days of the free "bash the Italians", on their entry
into the war, are now starkly removed.
The effect on the Axis players style of strategic play, is significant. The
ahistorical tour de force mopping up western Europe after France 1940 is
stopped in its tracks, and the Yugoslavian misadventure has more realistic
consequences in terms of states of readiness for the upcoming Russian campaign.
Note it does not stop this behaviour in any real sense, but gives the
Germans greater pause on consequences rather than doing such invasion "sinply
because he can". This in turn, may be a useful learning experience, giving some
different insights and appreciations.
Now there will always be those who do not find this to their taste, and
others who do. These polarised positions are catered for with the fact that the
effects are completely optional.
Certainly in my personal experience of the game in this guise I find myself
very conscious of problems:-
Shortages of ready trained reserves, effectively ill equipped and trained
forces that I desperately need to use, but must forego, or throw them away
ineffectually because they are not fit to hold their place in the line. A
familiar position to those in the autumn 1844 situation in France...or Poland at
the same time.
As with many options, the effects may tend to polarise positions, both sides
seeking to illustrate their points with examples of gameplay. The fact that
both sides might do this, indicates a not altogether one sided effect from
this.
But as can be said. Those who hate the concept, can simply turn it off, and
be no more troubled by it.
In terms of hard experience, the jury is still out, but some of the effects
seem to have a better subjective feel, to my mind.
-|steve|-
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