[Consim-l] CV Session Report

[Mike NotSpecified]

I'm glad you enjoyed it Dave.  Good summary of the situation.  One of the 
reasons I like wargaming is it lets you play around with different 
alternatives.  Even if you mostly follow historical strategy and tactics, the 
actual experience of trying to find the other fleet, get in range, coordinate 
your different plane types, handle the planes on deck, maintain a CAP and 
avoid detection yourself, well, it really brings to life the things you read. 
 "being there" adds a lot to the expereince.

Another book on Midway I highly recommend is Shattered Sword.


On Fri, 5 Jan 2007 15:40:22 -0800
  "Dave Kohr" <davekohr at gmail.com> wrote:
> Thanks Mike for that excellent AAR!
> 
> On 1/5/07, Mircea Pauca <mircea.pauca at gmail.com> wrote:
>>    Another question, now on historical doctrine:
>> was it relevant for Japanese (or other amphibious powers)
>> to have completely dedicated Carrier, Bombardment and
>> Landing task forces ? wouldn't have been better for ships
>> to join and detach as needed, for more mutual protection ?
> 
> In retrospect, a more flexible sort of organization probably would
> have been more effective.
> 
> The largest TF I can think of during this time was the Japanese force
> that struck Pearl Harbor, which consisted of 6 fleet carriers. I
> wonder if in 1941-2 there were command/control problems that made it
> infeasible to form larger task forces. Even later in the war, the huge
> US carrier task forces such as TF 58 consisted of up to a half dozen
> task groups, each containing just a few carriers. (See
> http://pacific.valka.cz/forces/tf58.htm )
> 
> Also, I think the slow speed of troop transports made it necessary to
> split them off into a separate task force during the approach to an
> invasion target. Once a battle developed, certainly you would want
> fast carrier and battleship forces to manuever independently as needed
> to find and defeat the enemy fleet, or to screen the vulnerable
> transports and landing site.
> 
> Yet another reason the Japanese fleet was split in this way was that
> it was simply the favored Japanese command doctrine at that time. The
> Japanese plan for Midway was quite elaborate. As Mike's AAR mentioned,
> the invasion of Midway was supposed to bait the US into responding,
> and then being ambushed by the main Japanese carrier task force. On
> top of that, there was an invasion of some of the Aleutian islands
> (near Alaska), both to confuse the American commanders as to Japanese
> intentions, and also give them even more reason to sortie a fleet in
> response. As for setting ambushes, the Japanese had not only their
> carriers, but also a large screen of submarines, deployed on the
> likely route the US fleet would take from Pearl Harbor to Midway.
> 
> One book that covers the planning on both sides pretty well, with
> interviews of many of the participants, is Walter Lord's "Incredible
> Victory".
> 
> Ultimately, though, the Japanese were doomed at Midway by the fact
> that their doctrine in general, and the plan for Midway in particular,
> badly under-emphasized air search for the enemy fleet. As Markus has
> pointed out in the past, they relied mostly (solely?) on slow float
> planes to find the enemy fleet. On the approach to Midway, they
> couldn't even get them all in the air on time! The one particular
> float plane that ultimately found the Yorktown had been launched hours
> late due to technical problems, with the result that the US carriers
> struck first and won a huge victory. In contrast, US doctrine placed 2
> squadrons of SBD Dauntlesses on each fleet carrier, one nominally for
> bombing, the other for scouting.
> 
> Dave
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